Designers, games and players: Same game, different rules? by Gregersen, Andreas Lindegaard
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Designers, games and players: Same game, different rules?
Gregersen, Andreas Lindegaard
Publication date:
2005
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Unspecified
Citation for published version (APA):
Gregersen, A. L. (2005). Designers, games and players: Same game, different rules?.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
Designers, games and players: Same game, different 
rules? 
Andreas L. Gregersen 
Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen 
E-mail: agr@hum.ku.dk 
 
ABSTRACT 
The overall subject of the paper is single user interaction with 
computer video games incorporating virtual environments. The 
paper proposes a three part model of designer, game system and 
player. A prominent aspect of the relationship between player and 
video game is seen as a relationship between the embodied 
individual and a simulated, physical environment designed for 
interaction. The paper argues that the broad use of the term 
“rules” is problematic – and in certain cases decidedly 
counterproductive – and it proposes that we instead consider the 
term “simulation laws” and embodied interaction with the 
regularities resulting from this simulation. 
Keywords 
Embodied cognition, Game systems and design, Game play, 
Interaction  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Games are something that people play, and computer games are 
designed to be played – or interacted with. Many modern games 
involve the simulation and representation of a virtual environment 
(cf. Aarseth [1]), and these games are the focus of the following 
discussion. I start by giving an outline of computer games as 
designed systems, and I discuss the fact that game interaction is an 
activity that demands player competences that are both cognitive 
and embodied. I then argue that since many new games 
incorporating virtual environments utilize simulation of a physical 
world much like the real one,  we should not try to describe this 
part of games as based on rules – be it a game rules or some other 
kind. Instead I propose that we acknowledge that certain 
relationships in game worlds are better understood as being 
governed by the simulation of laws, that we interact with these on 
the basis of embodied skills, and that Ludus rules in computer 
games should be understood as something that is often applied 
“on top of” a simulation structure. 
2. ANALYSIS OF COMPUTER GAMES 
Starting with computer games in general, there have been several 
proposals within game studies as to how one can analyze a video 
game system structurally and/or formally. The introduction to 
Wolf and Perron [28] gives a brief overview of the different 
positions, summarizing the most relevant analytical categories as 
being those of “algorithm”, “player activity”, “interface” and 
“graphics”. Konzack [21] has proposed a total game analysis 
framework consisting of seven layers; hardware, program code, 
functionality, game play, meaning, referentiality, and socio-
culture. Aarseth (ibid.) has proposed a tripartite model, where 
game-play, game-structure and game-world are the three most 
relevant dimensions of game analysis. In the next sections I 
present a level-based model of the game as a functional system 
designed for interaction. I shall not make use of the exact 
terminology proposed by any one of the texts mentioned above, 
but the purpose will be to address many of the same issues.  
2.1 The game as multi level system 
The first relevant level is the hardware. This can be functionally 
defined as consisting of CPU, GPU, RAM, storage devices, buses 
and pipelines etc., allowing the framework to address different 
physical platforms under the same headings.  Hardware works 
more or less directly together with the code level, often also 
referred to as the software layer. Since code runs on hardware, 
hardware considerations will be relevant to games analysis to a 
certain extent; the computational power inherent in a given 
hardware configuration combined with given code constrains 
design of and interaction with game systems. We will return to 
this in section 5. For the present purposes, the most significant 
part of the code level is the game code or game architecture. This 
is sometimes referred to as consisting of one or more engines; the 
game engine handles core mechanics of the game proper, the 
physics engine calculates so-called rigid body dynamics, while the 
graphics engine handles (certain) calculations and rendering of 
visual states. There is of course no straight divide between these, 
but it allows one to address specific functionality in the code 
layer. 
Returning to the system of levels, the game code is responsible for 
the calculations of game level properties. Borrowing an important 
distinction from Dourish [6], there is a gap between the level at 
which the game is implemented by the system and the level at 
which it is abstractly realized. Here, implementation is the 
workings of code and hardware, while abstract realization is the 
game level. The latter is the realm of ludological entities: An 
analysis of the game level would yield information such as the 
rules of the game, the number of save games, number of lives and 
pause/non-pause states, and maybe also current objectives 
stipulated by the game in slightly abstract terms. I would also urge 
a distinction at the game level between a) game rules and b) the 
laws and relationships of the game world part of the game level; 
the latter contains characters, creatures and objects and their 
respective states, the state of the total simulated environment and 
the regularities pertaining to relationships between agents, objects 
and setting. The distinction between non-diegetic information 
states and diegetic game world, well known from both literary and 
audiovisual narratology (and applied to game studies by e.g. Wolf 
[29]), captures some of this distinction between game information 
and game world information. Juul [17] distinguishes between 
rules and fiction, which is also somewhat parallel to the present 
distinction between game and game world, but my view of the 
role of rules and laws differs from Juul’s, as I shall elaborate in 
section 5. Finally, the AVT-stream level is the audiovisual-tactile 
stream of information that is being continually created by the 
system by feeding output signals to loudspeakers (audio), screen 
or projector (visual) and force feedback mechanisms in controllers 
(tactile). The game level and the AVT-stream are thus the primary 
parts of the system dealing with the simulation and representation 
of an environment that allows us to speak of a Tomb Raider game 
as involving “Lara moving through an Egyptian tomb” as opposed 
to, say, “thousands of variables manipulated over time by code 
running on a hardware platform”. 
The separation of game code architecture and game as distinct 
levels allows us to analyze a given computer game as a large 
structure of code, which is a necessity if one wants to address the 
question of how the computer game system actually computes 
and/or simulates the regularities involved in the manipulation of 
entities on a different level of realization, such as characters and 
(simulated) physical properties of objects. We have to progress 
from the level of code or game architecture to the levels of game, 
game world and AVT-stream in order to find the entities and 
relationships we’re usually interested in when we seek to analyze 
games. Even though high level scripting languages might 
designate certain objects as “objects”, the actual computations 
(and the machine language responsible) cannot be said to deal 
directly with Game World entities such as e.g. intricate dwarven 
artifacts in Elder Scrolls III: Morrowind or personality and mood 
of NPCs in GTA: SA. It is only the latter entities that we usually 
experience as being the meaningful parts of any given game. It 
might seem a rather banal fact that the properties and regularities 
of the game and game world are highly distinct from their 
programming implementation, but this particular aspect of the 
implementation-abstraction gap has ramifications for the analysis 
of the relationships between design and player interaction 
(sections 3 and 4) and the rules/laws distinction (section 5) 
 
Figure 1. The game system 
3. INTERACTION 
The concept of interaction is probably as polyvalent and 
multilayered as they come; overviews within media studies and 
game studies have been given by Jensen [15], Bruhn Jensen [3] 
and Klastrup [20]. Common to these definitions is a positing of a 
close relationship between interaction and communication, and 
since I would like to avoid this for the time being, I will start with 
a more general definition of interaction by stating that humans 
interact with the physical environment all the time. The following 
approach is inspired by the theory of embodied cognition as 
presented by Clark [4] and Kirsh [19], by the “skills and abilities” 
perspective of embodied interaction as it is employed by Dourish 
[6], and by the application of embodied cognitive theory to 
computer games analysis seen in Grodal [13]. The general idea is 
that activity and interaction depends upon cognitions tightly 
integrated with embodied activity in the physical world. 
Perception is seen as integrated in an action structure that tracks 
and reacts to sensori-motor regularities arising from the coupling 
of individual and environment. The regularities pertaining to this 
kind of general interaction are determined by factors related to 
both individual and environment, where the two constantly 
influence each other over time. In the present framework, the 
individual is a game player with motivations and a set of 
competences, the most important for the present purposes being 
cognitions (conceptual schemata) and embodied skills available 
for recruitment through intentions. The environment is here the 
combination of physical game system and simulated game world. 
3.1 The question of the sociality of interaction 
The following caveat might be in order at this point. The rest of 
the paper focuses on individuals interacting with single player 
game media. Sociologically inclined researchers of media and 
games would probably hold that an analysis of individuals 
involved in media consumption simply cannot be detached from 
an analysis of the social. This kind of reader would find support 
for such a standpoint in the works of the authors just cited for 
inspiration above: The aforementioned perspectives of Clark and 
Dourish both draw on ideas from distributed cognition and 
cognitive ethnography, and it is a major point of Dourishs’ 
approach to HCI that it seeks to engage the social aspects of this 
relationship. One of the key ideas of distributed cognition is that 
cognitive representations will often be distributed among more 
than one individual and that these individuals will unload both 
memory and computational strain onto artifacts in the 
environment. I will nevertheless focus on single person activities 
in the following and maintain my focus on the relationship with 
an environment that is physical rather than social. I am certainly 
not stating that the beliefs, desires and embodied skills of an 
individual are autonomous from structures best understood as 
social, I am merely bracketing these factors to focus on the 
relationship between the single player individual and the 
simulated, physical game world in a series of interaction events. 
The primary question is probably to what extent the social nature 
of reality and the distribution of cognition is invalidating the 
following idealized exposition. I will attempt to comment on this 
idealization of relationships as I go along, but my contention is 
that the primary explanatory power of the model is not invalidated 
by social factors and that it may be augmented as needed: I thus 
urge that the reader think in terms of compatibility with other 
ideas and frameworks instead of inadequacy of correspondence 
with “actual, messy social reality” – whatever the latter might turn 
out to be represented as in scientific discourse.  
4. GAMES AS DESIGNED SYSTEMS 
Moving on to systems as products of design, a general theory of 
design and interaction is offered by Donald A. Norman, who has 
dealt with both computer application design specifically [23] and 
design processes in general [24]. The following model draws on 
Norman’s ideas of conceptual models and the distinction between 
the system and the system image as the two parts of a given 
designed system. The conceptual model is shorthand for how the 
user understands or conceptualizes a given design. The system is 
the total functional system, whereas the system image refers to 
only the visible part(s) of the system immediately available for 
information pick-up. Ontologically speaking, there is of course no 
way of designating a certain physical part of a system as not being 
a (potential) part of the system image, as e.g. engine hoods on cars 
should make evident. Also, the ability to see something as an 
indicator of system performance (and thus in some sense see it as 
part of the system image) varies between individuals – 
professionals can often tell things about systems that lay people 
are not able to see. The distinction between system and system 
image is, I think, first and foremost a pragmatic distinction 
supposed to highlight the fact that designers cannot depend on 
their users having technical or otherwise expert knowledge of 
things and their “insides”: They have to design the system so that 
users can deduce how it works from appearance, the general 
principle being that information about the relevant system states 
should always be available. Also, this information should be 
presented in a manner that accords with the way humans tend to 
process information. Many modern devices incorporate a visual 
display in the system image; in the case of game systems, the 
primary part of the system image is the AVT-stream. The overall 
framework is outlined in figure 2. 
4.1 The game system and user actions 
In the case of game systems, the player interacts with the game 
system through a control interface, this being the only way to alter 
the game state. To ease the following piece of exposition, I will 
limit myself to the cases where the game world is seen through a 
virtual camera and traversed by the player by either an onscreen 
avatar (this being a 3rd-person view) and/or an “embodied” off-
screen avatar (1st person view). The movement of avatar and 
camera is mapped to either a keyboard and mouse or a game 
control pad. The convention is that one can control the avatar 
and/or the camera with certain mappings; in the case of 1st person 
viewpoint, changing the camera means changing the avatars 
direction of facing (FPS-convention as in Doom, Quake, Halo, 
Half-Life and respective sequels), in other games the camera is 
movable independently of the avatar (e.g. action adventures such 
as GTA, SW: KOTOR, Ninja Gaiden and Prince of Persia: SoT). 
It is a general point of embodied cognitivism that perception is 
not passive but an activity integrated with the actions of the 
embodied subject. Perception is seen as an ongoing cycle of 
sampling, exploration and manipulative interaction between 
environment and the cognitions and skills of the person, cf. 
Neisser [22] and Gibson [12]. If we apply this to video game 
playing, we end up with an interesting link between perception 
and embodied skills: We usually don’t have to think about 
moving e.g. our neck muscles and torso in order to get a better 
view or to check out something suddenly worthy of attention, but 
a change of viewpoint in a computer video game actually requires 
a mapping of that intent onto the control interface. This means 
that there is a kind of double intentional stream with regards to the 
perception and action cycle of computer video game play; both 1) 
the “normal” one that allows us to scan the environment with our 
eyes and ears and focus on certain aspects of reality and 2) the one 
that demands a mapped control action through the interface. A 
fascinating aspect of this is the fact that even though only one of 
these two streams have a direct causal impact on game state, I 
would contend that once the player “gets to grips with” the game 
– a process of actively acquiring a set of new embodied skills – 
this becomes a single, unified intentional stream of action: The 
expert player does not need to think about coordinating the 
change of viewpoint with a change in perceptual attention – he is 
simply actively exploring and manipulating the virtual 
environment. Another interesting fact is that player actions will 
usually be directed primarily at manipulating game level 
properties, but the player might draw on knowledge of how the 
other levels of the system influence the game level; developer 
console modes, cheat codes, cartridges and downloadable mods 
etc. are used by (in certain cases expert) players of single player 
games; server lag and other hardware related issues are sometimes 
exploited in multiplayer games. The way in which these multilevel 
operations are incorporated into the structure of action probably 
varies, but my intuition would be that the idea of unified action 
still applies to many expert players.  
4.2 Action and information 
User actions can be said to have a “feed-forward” direction of 
causality working from user intention to changes in system state; 
however, seen from the system end, a continual stream of 
information is also being “fed forward” in the opposite direction 
from the system via the AVT-stream to the user. Users will often 
have a high level goal and take action on a lower level in order to 
attain this goal – the set of lower level actions that can satisfy this 
will often, but not always, be quite varied ( e.g. the different ways 
of making a sandwich, getting to a specific place or leveling a 
character in a RPG). In Norman’s terms, the system image is 
supposed to reflect changes in the current system state by giving 
adequate feedback about the changes resulting from a given 
action. Every time a user takes action towards the artifact, s/he 
will be looking for information feedback1, and the adequacy of a 
given design is directly tied to how effectively the system image 
yields information (gives feedback) about the system state: 
Insufficient or arbitrary feedback leaves the user not knowing 
whether further action is required to bring about the goal. It 
should be clear that this information about system state has to be 
experienced as having some pertinence in relation to the high 
level goal – which is another way of saying that system states are 
meaningless without a minimal understanding of functionality: 
“What does that sound mean?”; “How does this aspect of system 
change help me reach my goal?” It will also be very important to 
the player to have access to information about various system 
states that are not direct results of actions but still pertinent to the 
current goals of the player. Almost all computer games with 
virtual environments generate events independent of user control: 
Event generation is perhaps the fundamental trait of a computer 
game system. The abstractly realized representations of the 
simulation of various physical processes and agencies might or 
might not be directly caused by the player but they can still be 
highly relevant to player concerns. Considering the fact that the 
AVT-stream in theory carries information about hundreds of 
corresponding properties of both game and game world and feed-
forward of AVT-information is constant, the user is prone to look 
specifically for information in accordance with the current 
structure of actions related to goals. What just happened after I 
pushed button X? What could be relevant to my current goals? 
What could change my goal? 
  
Figure 2. Designer, system and user 
 
Following the above, the well designed game system is set up to 
primarily deliver two kinds of information through the AVT-
stream; both feedback to immediate actions and the relevant “feed 
forward” of information that is involved in the current game play. 
Another way of phrasing this would be that game systems in 
single player games often need to “predict” what kind of 
information is needed at any given moment. Also worth noting is 
the fact that these notions of relevant information and player 
influence are codependent and tied to player concerns and 
motivation; an actual interaction episode cannot be analyzed by 
just looking at the AVT-stream without taking into account 
current player goals. 
4.3 The embodied competences of the player 
As can be seen in figure 2, following both Norman and general 
consensus within embodied cognition, the player has to rely solely 
on her/his competences and knowledge of the game system when 
interacting with the system. By interacting with the game system, 
players effectively change their models of the game and their 
embodied skills: They learn new facts about the game rules, they 
learn to track an increasing amount of the regularities of the game 
world and they learn to master the controls needed to traverse the 
universe in question. The embodied knowledge of the player – 
his/her game competence, one might call it – is constantly 
developed by interacting. Since the only source of knowledge 
about the current state of affairs is the system image (i.e. the 
AVT-stream), this is the primary input to updating the user’s 
models. Even though the unified action stream might draw on 
multilevel knowledge, the average player does not have any real 
access to hardware states, software states nor the design models of 
the design team. As mentioned above, everything in the interface 
in some way carries information about the game world state. From 
the perspective of the designer, it is vital that the system is set up 
in such a way that information relevant to the rules and 
simulations of the underlying game mechanics are being reflected 
in an adequate way. These display regularities govern the 
multitude of ways in which the AVT-interface reflects the game 
and game world states, and they are absolutely central to user 
interaction, since the user only has access to the game and its 
current state through the interface: Whether “it’s in the game” or 
not, if it’s not “in the interface”, no one will know it’s in the 
game. 
There is an important exception to the abovementioned relation 
between system, system image and user models. As Norman 
points out, most appliances come with instructions, but his 
(clearly normative) point is that any appliance should be self 
explanatory, i.e. usable with only a minimal user need for 
documentation (obviously, this “no manual” attitude may or may 
not be part of the design philosophy of a given game). Most 
games do come with manuals, and these are usually a vital 
resource for building an initially valid conceptual user model, but 
the main point here is that since games are played by other 
players, one can usually consult other sources in order to update, 
correct or augment one’s conceptual model of a given game. 
Anyone with an internet connection can access vast amounts of 
walkthroughs, hints, forum posts and even media files dealing 
with the intricacies of popular games. Naturally, this primarily 
applies to the cognitive aspects of the mental modeling: Very few 
players would be able to read themselves to a complete 
understanding of the control of human avatars and vehicles in 
games (also see section 5 and 6 below), since this is very much 
dependent on embodied skills. The requisite skills of e.g. visuo-
motor coordination required by some games may be quite 
demanding; even though a player ”knows what to do” s/he might 
not be able to do it at all – Ninja Gaiden comes immediately to 
mind to this casual console player. This is in line with the 
intuitive notion that cognitive schemas are more immediately 
flexible than embodied skills – paraphrasing Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
[8] there is a big difference between knowing that and knowing 
how. 
4.4 Model and implied players  
Summarizing this far: Design processes incorporate designers 
working from design models; this leads to a designed system 
incorporating a system image; interaction with this system is a 
progressive embodiment of conceptual models and skills on the 
part of the player. One way to characterize this interaction is the 
idea of embodied cognitive construction as reconstruction2: The 
claim is that part of what is being progressively reconstructed 
through interaction is in fact the players own version of the design 
intentions that went into the game design process. By partial 
reconstruction I do not mean that some parts of the player 
experience is completely identical to design intentions while 
others may vary. Partial reconstruction is similar to posited design 
models because design constrains player behavior; the designed 
structure causes a degree of similarity with preconceived design 
ideas. However, since the player is interacting with the system 
exhibiting its own regularities, there will be many aspects of game 
functionality that are not intentional in a design sense. This goes 
for bugs as well as the many documented instances of “emergent” 
regularities of game worlds (see Juul [16]), many of which are 
better thought of as unintentional by-products of the design 
process. 
The claim is simply that designers often think about users and 
their competences when designing artifacts – this would seem to 
be the basic idea of user-centered design. The viewpoint is, in 
capsule form, that any artifact can be said to entail or presuppose 
its user as a consequence of its structure, and designers work 
from this assumption when designing game systems. The structure 
of an artifact stipulates certain conditions that have to be met in 
certain ways in order for interaction to happen: Model and 
implied players are ways of stating these in abstractly 
anthropomorphic terms3. The model player is a gestalt – 
consisting of a set of competences – invoked by a designer or a 
design team in order to gauge the probable interaction structure of 
a coupling between a set of actual, real players and the current 
game functionality. In comparison, the implied player is the set of 
competences presupposed by the actual, current structure of the 
game system; this is an abstraction based on the game system 
structure, not the conceptual model of the designer and not actual 
player behavior. In a design process, these two player gestalts can 
be said to operate both implicitly and explicitly. Implicitly, the 
structure of a game always presupposes certain skills on the part 
of the user, whether designers think about it or not; the implied 
player is thus always there. But this implication can be “extracted” 
from a given structure at any given juncture of the design process. 
This gestalt can be compared to the intentions (i.e. model players) 
of the design team – noting that these designer intentions may 
vary considerately in form and degrees of concreteness. Any 
design process can thus make use of model player and implied 
players as explicit constructs; the designers can use this 
hypothetical coupling to either change actual game structure or to 
change their model player assumptions – or both.  This is 
essentially a reflexive stance. Turning to an actual game play 
episode, the implied player is the “demand” in terms of player 
competences invoked by the systems current configuration. On 
this view, good progressive structure means a kind of parity 
between implied and actual player, bearing in mind that the appeal 
of games is often a certain level of challenge (see e.g. Salen and 
Zimmermann [ibid] , Juul [ibid.] and Csikszentmihalyi [5] 
The present approach should be directly compatible with 
approaches such as the one proposed by Bartle [2] (see also 
Taylor [27]), where players have different motivations for playing. 
Transposed to the current framework, this would mean that these 
different playing styles based on motivation probably go hand in 
hand with embodied skills and progressive structure – one is apt 
to enjoy what one is already proficient at, or at least has a chance 
to learn. One can furthermore treat the four categories as styles 
that may or may not be tied to the same individual in a given 
situation, and look at how different design decisions affect play 
and embodied reconstruction: Most single player games seem to 
vary their different segments and levels so that they demand 
different playing styles within the same game (e.g. The “Halo”-
level vs. the “Library”-level in Halo). A single game might 
facilitate one playing style only, but it might also facilitate 
different playing styles within the same environment, where 
segments of the game can be played for achievement and/or for 
exploration (e.g. the GTA series and Morrowind, see below). 
Players with a consistent motivation for playing in a certain style 
might try to work against the implied player structure in a given 
game, try to configure the system in a way that suits them or 
simply pick up another game. 
5. RULES OR LAWS? 
Within game studies quite a few scholars (most notably Salen and 
Zimmermann (hereafter S & Z) [25] and Juul [17]) hold that 
games should be studied as systems of rules, in accordance with 
the canonical work of Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois. S & Z 
offer a comprehensive framework for both game design and game 
analysis, and while I agree that the perspective of rules is helpful 
in addressing issues of both design and gameplay in computer 
video games, I find the ludologists’ rather eclectic use of the 
concept rules problematic. In terms of the present framework, the 
design models cognized by the designer(s), the rules and laws of 
the game system, and the rules and regularities observed and 
cognized by the computer game player are interrelated, but 
sometimes quite different things. 
First off, there is the case of games vs. computer games. I take it 
that “classic” games such as Chess, Tic-tac-toe and Monopoly can 
be described fully by listing the rules: But these are limit cases 
and pose problems when it comes to computer games. An 
important distinction here is between what is possible and what is 
allowed. In the case of classical games, we can list (a specific 
variation) of the rules of the game, and one of the primary 
functions of these rules is to delineate what counts as valid actions 
and states and what is not allowed in the game context. Chess 
rules stipulate that players cannot legitimately move the rook 
diagonally, but in a setting of actual, physical chess playing, 
nothing prevents a player from actually doing it – it won’t be 
recognized as a valid move, but the actual action of moving the 
piece is possible. This is because the physical setup of the game 
and the natural laws of our universe do not make much of a 
difference in chess – chess is all about the rules. This changes 
when it comes to almost any sport. All ball games utilize explicit 
rules, while implicitly exploiting constraining facts about the 
physical world and the anatomy of humans, as also pointed out by 
Juul [ibid.]. All game rules take certain physical and biological 
constraints for granted: It would clearly be pointless for both 
game and sports rules to deal with activities that are impossible to 
perform. One of the key functions of game rule sets is rather to 
stipulate both what is not allowed and the consequences in case 
players do something forbidden. 
The distinction between simulation of (often physical) 
relationships and game rules is well known by researchers within 
the field – the simulation ludology proposed by Frasca [10, 11] 
distinguishes between paidea and ludus, S & Z [ibid.] 
distinguishes between three kinds of rules, Juul [ibid.] 
distinguishes between different rules governing fiction and game 
– but the terminology used in all places is still “rules”. One of the 
problems is that the term rules is used to designate certain 
structures and relationships that can be adequately couched in 
propositional terms, but they are also used to try and grasp 
something which simply cannot. It is also applied to relationships 
that are or can be potentially acknowledged by individuals as 
rules, and to relationships that cannot. I take it as a defining 
characteristic of a rule that it is actually possible to state the rule 
in natural language, but I would also like to hang on to the idea 
that game rules are fundamentally conventions: Players are 
supposed to understand, acknowledge and follow these rules, as 
emphasized by both Caillois and Huizinga. Following this, a 
modern game world is governed by mechanics that I would rather 
call simulated laws, since they do not regulate what is allowed but 
rather what is possible in that universe. Non-acknowledgement or 
violation within the simulated environment is impossible, since 
there is no way to defect from game mechanics (such as e.g. D20) 
or simulated physics, short of rearranging the system code or 
stopping play.  
This mechanically given and non-negotiable character of certain 
computer game relationships is acknowledged by the four authors 
(Frasca, S & Z and Juul) in slightly different ways. Frasca’s 
Paidea-Ludus distinction is co-opted from Caillois and is meant to 
distinguish between two kinds of activities (play and game), 
which means that computer games can be placed in a continuum 
between these two poles, since they usually imply both to varying 
degrees. Frasca also maintains that both kinds of activities are 
governed by rules; the principal difference is that Ludus implies 
victory or defeat conditions, whereas Paidea does not. I may be 
reading him wrong, but it sometimes seems that Frasca means that 
simulations fall into the first category, and classical games into the 
second, but I think that is not quite true, as I will elaborate below. 
S & Z’s view is that “rules limit player action”, but one could ask 
both Frasca and S & Z if everything that limits player action has 
to be a rule? Could it not be, say, simulated laws implementing a 
certain relationship with certain higher order features (e.g. hills or 
rigid structures) in the simulated landscape? S & Z use an 
example from Thief in order to differentiate between what is 
included in the rules and what is just “part of the game world”. 
The Thief games are “First Person Sneaker” games where the 
primary objective is to stay quiet and unseen (as opposed to the 
all-out mayhem of many FP-Shooters). S & Z’s view is that since 
the differently rendered surfaces in the game world produce 
different sounds when interacted with, these relationships are part 
of the rule structure. My view is rather that many modern 
computer games are a lot like real life sports: They apply rules “on 
top of” laws, but in computer games, the presupposed structure of 
law-like constraints is simulated. Computer games simulate 
certain relationships and Ludus rules are (or can be) applied to 
work with these. In the Thief example, neither the sounds nor the 
relationship are part of a rule structure but rather the result of a 
simulated interaction of different materials and such a simulation 
of specific relations can be exploited by different Ludus rules in 
different ways. A similar (but simpler) simulation mechanic is 
found in Halo, where the sound of the avatars footsteps also 
change according to certain floor materials – but in Halo this is 
not used in the calculation of enemy AI at all. One might say that 
the games have similar simulation layers but different rules (see 
the analysis of GTA: SA below).  
Juul’s stance is somewhat different. He points out that some video 
games (e.g. soccer games) have to implement some kind of 
simulation of the laws of physics as well as the game rules, but 
since both depend on computation, Juul states that this simulation 
is implemented “on the same level as the explicit rules of the 
game”, and he goes so far as stating that “everything that governs 
the dynamical aspect of a game is a rule” [ibid., emphasis in orig. 
both places]. The first sentence is true in the sense that code can 
be said to implement everything in computer games and it is 
worth emphasising that lawful relations in computer games and 
game worlds are always due to the workings of code and 
hardware. But Juul’s second statement seems much more 
problematic and does not follow from the first. Simulation is the 
basis for physical, dynamic relations in the game world, but this is 
usually realized by massive amounts of algorithms incorporating 
functions involving differentials, constants and variables etc. I 
find it counterproductive to use the term “rules” about such 
mathematical algorithms. I also doubt that the average games 
analyst would be able state any of them when faced with a given 
computer game.  
I do agree that there is explanatory power in analyzing a certain 
aspect of computer games as structures of rules akin to the 
classical sense, but I also think that when one extends the 
explanatory domain to “everything that governs dynamics” the 
status of these rules become questionable. Furthermore, the move 
from design to analysis is from stipulation to explanation, which 
means that all the usual problems apply when one tries to describe 
regularities; e.g. is a given rule expressed as suitably abstract, 
under what conditions does it hold, is it general enough to cover 
all relevant cases, how do we know that X is really a result of Y, 
and not caused by Z which correlates with Y, etc.? If you add the 
problems concerning multiple realizations in computational 
systems, it seems to me that games analysts have a very slim 
chance indeed of describing any actual “rules” governing the 
simulation layer in any modern game incorporating simulation of 
physics or A.I. 
We might also ask the question of whether player behaviour 
depends on rules, and if yes, what kinds? If one believes in rule 
governed behavior at all, there is no principled reason to exclude 
computer game players. Since I believe that the structure of 
artefacts constrain user behavior, I think that certain aspects of 
player behavior can be described in terms of rules –but if we want 
to uncover these rules of playful interaction, a better candidate 
than game rules would be those of psychology and social science 
(the usual problems (some of which are mentioned above) would 
of course still apply, now with respect to people instead of game 
systems). We might also ask whether players cognize game rules 
in a conscious manner. Some of the time it certainly seems like it, 
e.g. when they act according to game rules, try to meet victory 
conditions and/or goals etc. But do they also cognize the 
simulated world as being governed by rules? Probably not as 
much as they do not: As Dreyfus and Dreyfus [ibid.] note, rules 
are often used as a supplement to embodied skills, but a skillful 
performance can very seldom be described in rules by the skilled 
person. Players can make use of “rules-of-thumb” such as “do not 
brake and steer at the same time” when they enter a curve in a 
driving game, but such rules are only helpful up to certain point; 
after which the situation is a lot more like driving a (real) car or 
catching a thrown ball. Your body has to learn how to do it. 
Sophisticated simulation of physics and AI is of course not 
manifest in all games, but as computer systems get more and more 
advanced, the previously impossible simulation of both realistic 
physics and quasi-sentient behavior is rapidly becoming an 
integrated part of the simulated virtual environments of computer 
games. The fact that a computer game universe is computationally 
simulated and thus of a mechanistic nature that can be altered in a 
multitude of ways is not really an issue here, since the regularities 
in question simply don’t take the form of game rules – what are 
the rules of throwing crates or cars around or the rules of the 
guards’ behavior in Half Life 2 and what rules govern the benefits 
obtained by purchasing a new intake and exhaust combo in a 
racing simulator/game such as Forza Motorsport? It is plausibly a 
game rule of Project Gotham Racing 2 that you lose your kudos 
(score points) if you crash into stuff, but in order to actually 
“obey” this rule, you have to use your embodied skills to track 
and react to the variables associated with the track, the speed and 
handling characteristics of the car, etc. The actual computation 
responsible for this simulation may or not be based on rules (e.g. 
it can be connectionist, utilize probabilistic algorithms etc.), or it 
might be rule based but utilize completely different rules from 
those that players and analyzers posit. The interesting thing is that 
if we look at the player, it doesn’t really matter how the 
simulation of physical relationships is implemented in the code 
layer – a very significant aspect of interacting with virtual worlds 
is not based on cognizing rules or other linguistic constructions. 
These aspects of virtual worlds are grasped and reacted to as 
regularities by the embodied player, just as similar relationships in 
the real world. 
6. SAMPLE GAME ANALYSIS 
The single player campaign in Halo is a good example of a 
gradual expansion of the set of conceptual models and embodied 
skills needed to complete the different levels. The singleplayer 
campaign also functions as a tutorial for players to gain 
rudimentary skills to be able to enjoy the multiplayer 
functionalities of the game – although, interestingly, some of 
these concepts and skills will have to be partially unlearned and 
restructured once one starts playing with and against other human 
players. The first level of the single player campaign introduces 
you to moving the avatar on foot and the rudimentary combat 
mechanics. On the second level one gets the opportunity to 
control the Warthog, which means the player has to expand 
his/her embodied set of skills and juggle two modes of control. 
Vehicle driving is especially sensitive to immediate feedback in 
order for the player to accurately gauge the amount of 
manipulation needed; variables such as traction and speed need to 
be gauged from the transformations of the system image, and 
Halo, as is now customary, utilizes all three channels of the AVT-
stream for this purpose. As already mentioned, these relationships 
of vehicle speed and traction are not expressible in rules, but the 
regularities are easily interacted with through embodied motor 
skills. Later, the game introduces the Flood, and the player has to 
augment his competences even further when s/he has to juggle the 
skills necessary to neutralize several types of enemies with quite 
different attack patterns. Also, a cognitive (and possibly 
emotional) reversal occurs when the player learns that s/he has 
been cheated into helping a robot guardian whose real plan is not 
to help the avatar but rather to destroy all life in the galaxy. This 
simultaneously restructures the relationships between the entities 
in the game world by making an enemy of a former ally, 
demanding that the player learns to avoid or neutralize the 
formerly friendly robots. Another noteworthy fact about Halo (and 
its sequel) is the way users have been toying with the 
idiosyncrasies of the physics engine in order to toss about 
Warthogs, tanks and other things in ways that completely defy the 
normal laws of gravity. This is clearly not designed, but a by-
product of a designed structure. 
In GTA: SA, the player is also being gradually introduced to the 
mechanics and laws of both the game rules and the game world by 
a carefully designed progression structure. Progressing through 
the first missions, you are given specific goals in the game world 
while the non-diegetic interface distributes goal-pertinent 
information about how to ride vehicles, climb fences and walls 
(“press button X to do Y”, etc), about game rules (consequences 
of hospitalization etc.). It also offers up the current objective if 
you seem to linger. This is both an augmentation of conceptual 
knowledge of the game rules, of the world of San Andreas and an 
“invitation” to increase your skills in order to explore and achieve 
at the same time. These invitations cannot be overheard 
consistently if one wants to interact with the environment. Since 
the environment is essentially hostile, the virtual world of San 
Andreas cannot be explored in full without mastering the controls 
of avatar movement and of the various aggressive actions. A large 
part of mastering the game consists of learning to control the 
different vehicles, and since these utilize the simulated physics of 
the game in different ways, it calls for embodied skills of a quite 
sophisticated nature. The difference between simulation laws and 
game rules is visible in the way the “mission” mechanic of the 
game works. The various missions all stipulate an overall goal and 
sketch out the requisite success conditions, and these are 
superimposed on the same simulated environment. The game 
world is in this way repeatedly recruited in different ways by 
differing rule structures to form the basics of smaller game 
systems. GTA: SA is a multitude of games set in a virtual, 
simulated world. 
I am not proposing a neat separation of rules-laws and game-game 
world here; As noted by Juul [ibid.] the GTA games exhibit a 
wide range of mildly curious overlaps between game rules and 
game world, (e.g. the many red “objective” markers and the large 
“Save Game” disk that sits quietly spinning in Carl’s kitchen in 
GTA: SA) This question of clashing explanatory levels is too 
complex to go into here, but I would suggest that the dichotomy 
Juul calls “rules vs. fiction” could just as fruitfully be construed as 
being between game rules (“Three strikes, you’re out!” and game 
world laws (“Mario has been reincarnated!”). 
The GTA series has been hailed as being open-ended and well 
suited for both goal-related and explorative player behavior – I 
have just mentioned how this is related to its combination of 
simulation and rules. On the subject of exploration, Aarseth [1] 
tells us how he happily explored the notoriously open-ended 
Elder Scrolls III: Morrowind and completely missed a central 
feature of the game, until he consulted a walkthrough. His 
consultancy resulted in an “overdose” of implied player structure 
and resulting disappointment when he became aware of the fact 
that the game actually has a carefully designed central series of 
quests that the player is supposed to accept. This series of quests 
has a delicately balanced storyline in which you gradually learn 
more about the individuals and institutions in the game world. 
This is obviously designed to gradually drag the player into an 
epic story of political intrigue and power struggles involving the 
players avatar, the indigenous population, the occupying Empirial 
forces and eventually a couple of the local deities. One of the 
main differences between Morrowind and many other games is 
that it doesn’t force you into this specific gradual development 
cycle. Morrowind’s design does however necessitate that the 
player adopts an achieving playing style in order to explore, since 
– as is the case with GTA: SA and several other games – many 
areas are simply off limits to low level characters. The many ways 
one can “achieve” in the game is however an impressive design 
feat. And a little note on feedback: Morrowind did not originally 
feature a way of knowing how close to death an opponent was. 
This was clearly a design decision, but one unpopular in the 
gaming community, so the latter, patched version features a 
yellow bar showing the health status of the enemy currently 
engaged. 
7. CONCLUSION 
I have sketched out a model of the game system as a product of 
design models and given suggestions to how one can understand 
player interaction with the game system. Lodged within the 
framework are at least two more general, one of them admittedly 
polemical, points.  
The first is the idea of understanding design as an intentional 
reconstruction process. To researchers coming from an aesthetic 
tradition, this may seem to imply a version of the intentional 
fallacy, but my position is not the one advocated by Humpty 
Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s classic tale, i.e. that whatever one 
intends with an utterance is what it means. I merely state the 
rather basic assumption that cultural artifacts such as games are 
designed systems. This means that the people behind the design 
had some specific ideas about the effects on the end user. The 
framework addresses the point of varied consumption by 
acknowledging that players are free to do whatever they want with 
games – however, it is my contention that a substantial portion of 
them enjoy doing what the designers meant them to do, i.e. 
experience a pre-structured relationship with a relatively open but 
still goal-related design structure. As far as I can see, the concept 
of reconstruction is in no way invalidated by (the claims of 
scholars who describe) players that seek to interpret, 
recontextualize, undermine or otherwise go against what seems to 
be designed features, neither does it exclude the enjoyment and/or 
exploitation of regularities that are clearly non-intentional. It 
simply points out that play may be following a set course much of 
the time. 
But even if preset courses are followed, the behavior need not be 
rule based: The second point – my “attack” on rules – is both an 
attempt to curb the use of rules as a blanket term for game 
analysis and a call for further discussion. Even though I 
personally don’t accept the many uses of the term rules, the design 
stance of the proposed framework is otherwise compatible with 
academic but practical design approaches such as the one 
proposed by Salen and Zimmerman and with many of the 
analytical insights of both Juul and Frasca. I propose that we 
consider the adoption of simulation laws (as in natural laws) as 
opposed to the almost ubiquitous use of rules as a descriptive and 
explanatory entity. The primary virtue of the “simulation laws” 
argument is that we get to distinguish between a) computationally 
simulated relationships between physical entities in the game 
world and b) Ludus rules that govern goals and valorization of 
outcome. It also lets us acknowledge the existence of 
computational, mechanistic relationships in games with which we 
are perfectly able to interact with because of our embodied 
abilities, and not because we “understand and/or follow the rules 
of the game”. Many of the simulated laws are just like the ones in 
our normal environment, and we are able to react to them in much 
the same way. Our embodied understanding of our everyday 
environment can often not be described as rule governed – and we 
should stop thinking that this is possible when it comes to 
computer game playing. Parts of this kind of interaction are not 
captured very well by game studies rule lingo, but an alternative, 
albeit rudimentary, definition might go something like the 
following, where ecological psychology, embodied cognition, 
phenomenology and psychology of perception, attention and 
action could be used to further augment the framework:  
The interaction with and feeling of a given virtual environment is 
directly dependent on the regularities exhibited by the 
representation of this environment when the user interacts with 
the system. This relationship can be understood as one involving 
represented regularities arising from both the simulation of laws 
and the implementation of rules and a player tracking and 
reacting to these through cognitions and embodied skills. 
While games like Tic-Tac-Toe can be reductively explained by 
rules expressed in a natural language (perhaps with a bit of logic 
on the side), this is simply not the case with virtual environments. 
So, regarding gameplay and rules, how about trying something 
else for a change?  
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1  This concept of feedback should not be confused with the 
feedback concept of cybernetics or systems theory where negative 
or positive feedback regulates the system towards or away from 
equilibrium. 
2 For a related, but slightly different view of the idea of 
understanding design as reconstruction of intentions, see 
Suchman [26] 
3 This idea has its parallels within literary theory, as Eco [9] and 
Iser [14] has used such concepts as model readers and implied 
readers. The concept of model player has been noted en passant 
by Frasca [10], and Järvinen [18] has mentioned the implied 
player, but in order to apply these two useful concepts in a game 
study context, I think we absolutely need to emphasize the fact 
that – in contrast to “readers” – these players are not meant to 
model or imply a specifically literary or linguistic competence nor 
a specifically aesthetic experience: Game interaction is embodied 
and not solely linguistic and it does not usually have the 
hallmarks of reflexive, aesthetic appreciation but rather of 
pragmatic interaction. 
